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FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS, CONNECTIONS, LEND ME YOUR
EARS: A NEW TEST FOR DETERMINING THE SUFFICIENCY
OF SERVICE OF PROCESS VIA SOCIAL MEDIA*
Christopher M. Finke**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of social media as a driving force in modern society
has brought it to the forefront of legal discussion in all areas of law.1
Fields of study such as evidence, ethics, and constitutional law are all
currently wrestling with how social media ought to be handled.2 In
particular, courts have attempted to determine whether service of
process (or simply “service”) should be satisfied by the use of
communication through social media.3
Since 1950, courts have relied upon the same test, regardless of the
method used, to determine the sufficiency of service: the Mullane
test.4 Mullane as currently applied, however, does not sufficiently
scrutinize service via social media in a manner conducive to

*
**
1.

2.

3.
4.

See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2.
J.D. Candidate, University of Baltimore School of Law, 2017. Special thanks to my
wife for putting up with the craziness that is law school life, and to my parents for the
opportunities they gave me by choosing homeschooling.
See generally Keely Knapp, Comment, #Serviceofprocess @Socialmedia: Accepting
Social Media for Service of Process in the 21st Century, 74 LA. L. REV. 547 (2014)
(arguing that “[b]ecause of social media’s pervasiveness, the legal system would be
doing itself an injustice to ignore this new technology as a means to effectuate service
when other methods fail”).
See, e.g., Laura E. Diss, Whether You “Like” It or Not: The Inclusion of Social Media
Evidence in Sexual Harassment Cases and How Courts Can Effectively Control It, 54
B.C. L. REV. 1841, 1846 (2013) (discussing the role of social media evidence in sexual
harassment cases); Ethical Obligations for Attorneys Using Social Media, PA. BAR
ASS’N (2014), http://www.danieljsiegel.com/Formal_2014300.pdf (discussing problems of legal ethics arising from the use of social media);
Tehrim Umar, Comment, Total Eclipse of the Tweet: How Social Media Restrictions
on Student and Professional Athletes Affect Free Speech, 22 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 311, 312–313 (2015) (discussing social media in the field of
constitutional law and arguing social media platforms are protected by the First
Amendment).
See Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015); Andrews v.
McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 51 (Okla. 2014).
See infra Section II.C.
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understanding the peculiarities of this method of communication.5
This Comment will not attempt to determine whether the use of
social media to effect service of process is constitutional.6 Rather, it
will show how the current application of the Mullane standard leads
courts to categorically accept or reject service as effected, and,
therefore, a new test ought to be adopted to measure the individual
social media communication method used to attempt service.7 This
test ought to be utilized to determine whether a particular use of a
specific social media platform has fulfilled the constitutional
requirements for service, vis-à-vis Mullane.8
This Comment will begin by examining the standard for sufficient
service of process established by the Supreme Court in Mullane,
followed by the cases expanding that decision; in particular Greene v.
Lindsey, Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, and Jones v.
Flowers.9
This Comment will also survey the technological
advancements that have affected courts’ determinations regarding
service.10 It will then observe how foreign courts have treated issues
of electronic service, as well as review the development of this issue
in the United States.11 Finally, this Comment will scrutinize current
methods of service, propose a new test that courts ought to use to
determine the sufficiency of service effected via social media, and
compare the test’s advantages to the current test.12
II. MULLANE AND ITS PROGENY
A. Define: Service of Process
Service of process is the system by which common law courts give
defendants notice of the proceeding pending against them.13 When a
suit is filed in a United States District Court, the plaintiff has a short

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Section IV.A.
That is, constitutional by way of application of current service jurisprudence. For
further discussion about the constitutionality, see William Wagner & Joshua R.
Castillo, Friending Due Process: Facebook as a Fair Method of Alternative Service,
19 WIDENER L. REV. 259, 263–264 (2013).
See infra Sections IV.A–IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Sections II.A–II.D.
See infra Section II.D.2.
See infra Part III.
See infra Sections IV.A–IV.C.
See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 195 (2004).
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amount of time in which he must notify the defendant.14 The
procedure for giving this notice in federal courts is governed by Rule
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15 For state suits, the
procedures are governed by local law or rules similar to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.16 The Constitution requires that a certain
floor be established for any process of supplying notice to be
sufficient.17
There are various types of service that have been acceptable, but
two bear mentioning. First, when a defendant is handed a set of
service papers by someone else, that is termed “personal service” and
it is preferable to nearly all other forms of service.18 Sending notice
by certified mail has been almost universally accepted,19 whereas
service by publication (i.e., publishing a notice in a newspaper over
the period of a few weeks) has been acceptable only under certain
circumstances.20 Any type of service not expressly enumerated by
the federal or state rules of procedure is labeled “alternative
service.”21
B.

Providing Notice in the World Before Mullane

The Supreme Court has long hinted that notice requirements may
be an issue of constitutional rights.22 These ideas, however, have
been tied to a confusing and unhelpful categorization of types of
actions.23 Actions in rem had different service requirements than an
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

23.

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (requiring defendants to be served within ninety days from the
filing of the lawsuit).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)–(m).
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating that powers not delegated to the Federal
Government are delegated to the States or to the people).
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1950)
(declaring service of process a due process concern).
See Matthew R. Schreck, Preventing “You’ve Got Mail”™ from Meaning “You’ve
Been Served”: How Service of Process by E–Mail Does Not Meet Constitutional
Procedural Due Process Requirements, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1121, 1129 (2005).
See id. at 1144 n.175.
See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (holding that service is sufficient provided the notice is
“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action”).
Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6 at 263–264.
See In re The Mary, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 126, 144 (1815) (“[I]t is a principle of natural
justice, of universal obligation, that before the rights of an individual be bound by a
judicial sentence, he shall have notice, either actual or implied, of the proceedings
against him.”).
Id. (noting differences between notice of actions in personam and in rem); see also
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1877) (describing claims that are only “in the
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action in personam.24 As law became more “settled,” the categories
became more unsettling, with actions that clearly fit into in rem or in
personam categories being distinguished from those “sometimes
termed in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more vaguely
still, ‘in the nature of a proceeding in rem.’”25 Such classifications
were later determined unnecessary, as the demands of the Fourteenth
Amendment are independent from the categorization of the claim
being brought.26
C. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
The Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. melded prior notions of notice into a single
coherent rule.27 The litigation in Mullane involved the notice
requirements of a New York statute regulating the creation of
common trust funds.28 The increasing costs of administering a small
trust became overly burdensome during and following World War II,
leading many states to allow the pooling of many small trusts into a
single common trust fund to be administered by a single entity.29 The
New York statute allowed the creation of a common fund, pending
approval of a state board, from any number of smaller trusts held by a
single trustee.30 A judicial settlement would establish the assets of

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

nature of a proceeding in rem” rather than actually in rem, and allowing alternative
service for such claims in particular circumstances). The distinctions created by
courts “concerned the presence of a person or thing and the type of notice required” to
sustain that type of action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 5 (AM. LAW
INST. 1982). In personam actions required that the court have jurisdiction over, and
notice be given to, a particular person. See id. In rem actions, by contrast, would
impose legal liability only upon the physically present property which was the subject
of the lawsuit. Id. Notice was given for this type of action when property was seized.
See id. Notice was formerly, therefore, a facet of personal jurisdiction. See id. With
the various types of actions subsumed into the same set of requirements, these
categories are effectively eliminated in personal jurisdiction analysis, Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 n.39 (1977), and service of process analysis, see Mullane,
339 U.S. at 312–13.
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–34.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312.
See id. at 312–13.
Id. at 314. For a general history of Mullane as well as the statute that the Supreme
Court overturned, see John Leubsdorf, Unmasking Mullane: Due Process, Common
Trust Funds, and the Class Action Wars, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1693, 1694 (2015).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 307.
Id. at 307–08.
Id. at 308–09.
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each individual owner to determine how much each investor should
gain from the investment.31
Central Hanover Bank and Trust established a common fund in
1946.32 The following year, it petitioned the New York courts for
settlement.33 One hundred thirteen small trusts were to be added to
the common pool, with total investment dollars valued at
approximately three million.34 The Court noted that the record was
unclear as to how many individual beneficiaries there were and where
those beneficiaries resided.35
Notice to the beneficiaries of the petition was provided in
compliance with the statute;36 the banking law required that notice be
made to beneficiaries by publishing “the name and address of the
trust company, the name and date of establishment of the common
trust fund, and a list of all participating estates, trusts or funds” in a
newspaper once a week for four weeks.37 In addition to the statutory
demands, Central Hanover Bank mailed notices to the beneficiaries
for which it readily had names and addresses.38 Mullane objected to
the service of process as insufficient under the Fourteenth
Amendment.39 The New York Surrogate Court presiding over the
matter overruled the objection.40 On appeal, the Appellate Division
and the Court of Appeals affirmed in turn.41
Mullane argued to the Supreme Court that, under the doctrines of
Pennoyer v. Neff,42 the trial court lacked jurisdiction.43 No property

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.
41.
42.

43.

Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 309–10.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 310–11. Mullane was appointed by the New York Surrogate Court to represent
all persons known and unknown who had an interest in the income of the common
trust fund. Id. at 310. Mullane was joined by James Vaughan, who represented those
who had an interest in the principle. Id.
Id. at 311.
Id.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878), held that service of process for in rem
proceedings where the property is owned by a non-resident is only sufficient where
the non-resident owner is given personal service. In that case, the failure to provide
personal service deprived the state court jurisdiction over the proceeding. Id.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 311–12. It was clear some of the beneficiaries were not
residents of New York. Id. at 309.
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was under contest in the settlement of the common trust;44 the
proceeding would have disposed of the beneficiaries’ right to sue the
trustee of the common fund for negligence or breach of trust.45
Without actual property under contest, the case would be categorized
as an in personam proceeding, requiring the parties to have been
notified via personal service.46 The Court, however, determined that
“the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the
standards are so elusive and confused generally . . . .”47
Instead of relying on these unstable and inconsistent rules, the
Court stated that constitutional notice requirements must meet a
balance between two values: the interest of the state in resolving
fiduciary issues and the interest of the individual as defined under the
The Court held that because the
Fourteenth Amendment.48
foundation of due process rights are in the right to be heard, notice is
necessarily an element of due process, as it allows a person to
“choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or
contest.”49 The Court undertook the task of building an effective test
to determine whether service was constitutionally sufficient.50
The Supreme Court determined that for service of process to
comport with the Fourteenth Amendment, the method of notice must
be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49.
50.

Id. at 313.
Id. at 311.
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312.
But the vital interest of the State . . . can be served only if interests
or claims of individuals who are outside of the State can somehow
be determined. A construction of the Due Process Clause which
would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could
not be justified. Against this interest of the State we must balance
the individual interest sought to be protected . . . . “The
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to
be heard.” This right to be heard has little reality or worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending . . . .
Id. at 313–14 (citations omitted).
Id. at 314.
Id. (“The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between
these interests . . . .”); see also Jo-Leo W. Carney-Waterton, Note, The Postman Must
Always Ring Twice: When Preliminary Attempts at Notice Are Unsuccessful, Is the
State Obligated to Take Additional Reasonable Steps to Ensure That a Person
Receives Adequate Notice?, 34 S.U. L. REV. 65, 79 (2007) (describing Mullane as “a
seminal, if not watershed, case in the historical succession of cases on the issue of
service”).
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opportunity to present their objections.”51 The analysis came in two
parts. First, the notice must reasonably convey the information
necessary for the defendant to respond.52 Second, the notice must be
received in such time as to give the defendant time to respond.53 And
with that, the old demarcations between proceeding types and notice
requirements were gone.54 This test remains the test used today.55
Ultimately, the Court held that notice was sufficient regarding the
beneficiaries who could not be found with reasonable diligence.56
Because contact information for those individuals could not be found,
it was reasonable under the circumstances that publication would be
the most effective method to convey the information about the
settlement proceeding.57 For those beneficiaries for whom Hanover
Central did have contact information, however, it was determined
that service was not sufficient.58 The known beneficiaries could have
been contacted by mail to alert them of the settlement of the trusts,
just as they had been notified a few years earlier to alert them of the
creation of the common trust.59
The Mullane test was meant to be flexible.60 The Court explicitly
considered the practical considerations of a strict test and rejected it
for those same reasons.61 This flexibility is not unlimited, as “a mere
gesture is not due process.”62 Yet, a party is only required to provide
notice to the extent “that the form chosen is not substantially less
likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary

51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
Id.; see also Brody v. Vill. of Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 130 (2d Cir. 2005).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison Cty., 665 F.3d
408, 434–35 (2d Cir. 2011).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 (“The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury,
but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the
subject with which the statute deals.” (quoting American Land Co. v. Seiss, 219 U.S.
47, 67 (1911))). But see Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 450–51 (1982).
See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
Id. at 317–18. The Court explained that only “ordinary standards of diligence” would
apply. Id. at 317. Even this diligence would be seen through the context “of the
character of the proceedings and the nature of the interests . . . involved . . . .” Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
See id. at 315 (“The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just
and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with
which the statute deals.” (quoting Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67 (1911))).
Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 315.
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substitutes.”63 This element of reasonableness allows for various
methods of service to find use and to be considered equally with
other methods.64
D. Service Through the Years Since Mullane
Because the test laid down in Mullane was meant to be flexible,65
development of service jurisprudence was necessary.66 The contours
of what would, or would not, sufficiently effect service would
become a point of discussion for the court over a series of cases
through the next few decades.67 The Court created this task for itself
by rejecting a stricter test.68 This element of reasonableness,
however, allowed the Court with room enough to accept new
methods of service, while protecting the rights of defendants.69
1.

The Development of Service Jurisprudence

The Court explored the contours of the test it laid down in the years
to follow.70 The Mullane test, however, did not face its first true
challenge until a string of cases reached the Supreme Court in the
early 1980s.71 Evictions, along with other real estate related financial

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.

Id. (emphasis added). The Court faced a similar issue in Walker v. Hutchinson City,
352 U.S. 112, 115–16 (1956).
See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, 319.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006)
See infra note 71.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15.
See id.
See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13–14, n.13 (1978);
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211, 212–13 (1962); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115–16, 116 n.5 (1956). The Court in Walker rejected
notice by publication for condemnation proceedings. 352 U.S. at 117. Schroeder,
relying on Walker and City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.
Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1952), rejected the use of a town paper and signs posted
around town (but not on the property in question) to provide notice to a landowner
during proceedings to divert a river when the landowner’s name and address could
have easily been ascertained from town records. 371 U.S. at 211. Finally, in Craft,
the court entered into a lengthy discussion of due process to determine that the “final
notice” mailed to the Crafts was sufficient to alert them that the gas and electricity
supplies would be terminated, but not that the Crafts had the opportunity to object to
the billing. 436 U.S. at 13. Therefore, the Crafts’ rights in this regard were not
foreclosed. Id.
See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 795–96 (1983); Greene v.
Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 447, 448–50 (1982); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 428–29 (1982); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 517 (1982). Greene
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issues, pressed the Court to explore the deeper meaning of the
Mullane test.72
In Greene v. Lindsey, the Court was faced with the eviction of
various inhabitants of apartments operated by the Housing Authority
of Louisville, Kentucky.73 The Housing Authority began detainer
actions for repossession in 1975.74 If the defendant could not be
found by the local police to effect personal service, state law directed
the police to leave a copy of the notice with someone in the residence
or post a copy “in a conspicuous place on the premises.”75 The
evicted tenants alleged never to have seen the postings or even have
learned of the eviction until a default judgment had already been
entered against them.76
The district court dismissed Lindsey’s case on cross-motions for
summary judgment because of a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case,
which predated the Mullane test.77 On review, the Court of Appeals
reversed based on Mullane.78 Greene argued that because the action
sits under the in rem category, notice by public posting is adequate
under Pennoyer.79 The Supreme Court determined this argument to
be inapposite and agreed with the Court of Appeals.80
The Supreme Court again rejected the notion that questions of
service ought to be determined by the property or person
categorization of the case.81 While the Court noted that posting
notice of eviction would generally be enough to satisfy due process,82
this particular reliance on posting notices did not satisfy
constitutional requirements.83 The Court stated that these particular
process servers were well aware that such notices were often

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

and Adams hold the most regard of the four, and therefore, only those two cases will
be discussed here.
See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223 (2006) (tax sale); Adams, 462 U.S. at 792–93
(tax sale); Greene, 456 U.S. at 447 (eviction).
Greene, 456 U.S. at 446.
Id.
Id. (quoting KY. REV. STAT. § 454.030 (1975)).
Id. at 446–47.
Id. at 447 (citing Weber v. Grand Lodge of Ky., F. & A. M., 169 F. 522 (6th Cir.
1909)).
Id. at 448–49.
See id. at 450; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
Greene, 456 U.S. at 456.
Id. at 450 (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312
(1950)).
Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.

148

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46

removed by other people in the common areas in which the notices
were posted.84
The Court combined this information with other factors to grade
the reasonableness test outlined in Mullane.85 A more reasonably
calculated method to give notice would have been to send the notice
by mail.86 Mailing the notice would be “efficient and inexpensive”
and was a method “upon which prudent men will ordinarily rely in
the conduct of important affairs.”87 Ultimately, the Court held that,
“where an inexpensive and efficient mechanism . . . is available to
enhance the reliability of an otherwise unreliable notice procedure,”

84.

85.
86.
87.

Id. at 453–54. Evidence in the record demonstrated that the individuals charged with
posting notice had personal knowledge that children from the apartment complex
often removed similar postings at the location of the eviction. Id. Footnote 7 of the
opinion includes the following exchange during a deposition:
The children-we had problems with children. They would take
[the writs] off. They never took them off when we were
present, but we, you know, assume-the Housing Authority told
us that they would take them off, so we always put them up
high.
Q. Did you ever see kids pulling them off?
A. Yes.
Q. You did?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Did you see many?
A. No, not too many. I did see it in one place over there.
Q. Where was that?
A. Village West.
Q. How many times did you see that happen?
A. Well, probably a couple of times.
Q. . . . Were you aware of there being any problem with
children ripping the Writs off?
A. Oh, we had plenty of trouble.
Q. You had trouble?
A. With kids, yeah. Yeah.
Q. Did you ever see kids ripping them off?
A. Yeah. I have seen them take them off of the door and I
would go back and tell them to put it back. They don’t know.
They didn’t know. They justQ. Were there any particular places where you saw kids
ripping them off the doors?
A. Well most of that was in Village West.
Id. at 453 n.7 (citations omitted).
Id. at 454 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
See id. at 455–56.
Id. at 455 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319).
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continued reliance upon the ineffective means does not meet the
Mullane standard for sufficiency of notice.88
About a year later, the Supreme Court once again set out to explore
the due process requirements of service of process.89 In Mennonite
Board of Missions v. Adams, a tax sale gave rise to the issue of
service.90 The Mennonite Board of Missions (MBM) sold a parcel of
land to Alfred Jean Moore on mortgage.91 According to the terms of
the agreement, Moore was to pay the taxes on the land;92 she failed to
do so and the property went to sale.93 The county initiated the
procedure for the tax sale, posted and published notice, and sent
notice via certified mail to Moore.94 Without a response from Moore,
the property was sold to Adams at an auction.95 MBM, although the
owner of the property, was never notified of the impending tax sale.96
When MBM finally found out about the tax sale, the redemption
period had already run, leaving litigation as the only option to regain
the property.97 When MBM contended that notice was not sufficient,
the trial court rejected the argument and upheld the state statute
requiring the outlined notice process.98 Indiana’s highest court
affirmed that decision, but the Supreme Court reversed.99
The Court again rejected the use of service by publication because
a more reliable means of communication was available.100 The
state’s failure to utilize an effective, yet reasonable, means of notice
Id. at 455–56 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319).
See Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 794–95 (1983).
Id. at 795.
Id. at 792.
Id.
Id. at 794.
See id. Moore was the mortgagee and therefore, not the actual owner of the property.
Id. at 792. Note, however, that this case, decided only a year after Greene,
incorporated the method of service expressly held in Greene to be an acceptable
alternative to posting.
95. Id. at 794.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 794–95.
98. Id. at 795.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 799. The Court did not address the use of certified mail for notice because the
letter would have only given Moore the required notice. Because MBM was the
owner of the property, it was entitled to the notice. See id. at 792. Moore was a mere
mortgagee. Id. The certified mail would have no effect on service requirements for
MBM. Ergo, only the publication remained for the Court to consider. See id. at 793
(illustrating that certified mail should have been sent to the owner of the property, not
the resident). The mailed notice was sent to Moore. Id. at 794.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
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invoked the ire of the Court: “[I]t does not follow that the [s]tate may
forego even the relatively modest administrative burden of providing
notice by mail to parties who are particularly resourceful.”101
Furthermore, “a State must provide ‘notice reasonably calculated,
under all circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections.’”102 The county’s use of publication, when direct
mail to the owner of the property is still “an inexpensive and efficient
mechanism,”103 led the Court to hold that the local government did
not demonstrate the intended desire to actually inform the party of the
proceedings.104
The Court also rejected the contention that a party must take steps
to “safeguard its interests.”105 The Court stated that even a
sophisticated party, such as MBM, is not required to go out of their
own way to protect their property interests;106 rather, it is the
responsibility of the party providing notice to do so in accordance
with due process requirements.107 The county’s easy access to tax
records—and hence MBM’s mailing address—made it clear to the
Court that the “minimum constitutional precondition” of notice was
not satisfied.108
Adams, however, went beyond the mere affirmance of the Mullane
rule.109 The Court in Adams clarified that the accuracy of the
delivery of service and intent of the delivering party are factors to be
considered in the analysis.110 The reasonableness of the method of

101. Id. at 799–800.
102. Id. at 795 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950)). Even though the parcel was occupied by Moore, her use of the land was
based upon a mortgage. Under Indiana law at the time, the mortgagee still retained a
property interest in the parcel. Id. at 798. Therefore, due process protections are
triggered, including service of process requirements. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
103. Adams, 462 U.S. at 799 (quoting Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 (1982)).
104. Id. (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 799–800.
108. Id. at 800.
109. Compare id. at 799–800 (expanding the Mullane analysis by discussing the accuracy
of and the intent behind service of process), with Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15
(establishing a flexible service of process test which requires the method of service to
be reasonable).
110. Adams, 462 U.S. at 799–800 (emphasizing that particular methods of service do not
demonstrate a desire to provide notice to a party and that accuracy of service is
essential despite the sophistication of the party).

2016

Service of Process via Social Media

151

service, therefore, was to include both objective factors111 and
subjective factors.112
The passing of years has not relegated the Mullane test to collect
dust on law library shelves.113 A situation of divorce allowed the
Supreme Court the chance to halt the extension of the Mullane test in
2006.114 The plaintiff, Jones, moved out of his Arkansas home and
into an apartment in Little Rock.115 Nevertheless, he continued to
pay the mortgage for the home, and the mortgagor would in turn pay
the property taxes for the home every year.116 After thirty years the
mortgage was paid off, leaving the property taxes to the
responsibility of the owner.117 Three years later, the state sent a letter
to the home to notify Jones that the property taxes for the home were
delinquent.118 The letter would have informed Jones that the property
would be sold if the taxes remained unpaid for two more years;119
unfortunately, no one was present at the home to receive the letter
and it was returned as “unclaimed.”120 Shortly before the date of the
sale, the state published a notice of the public sale in a local
newspaper.121 Flowers negotiated a purchase for barely a quarter of
the market value of the house.122 The state sent another notice to the
home in an attempt to contact Jones, but the letter was again returned
unclaimed.123
Jones filed suit for the state’s failure to provide notice and
deprivation of property without due process of law.124 On crossmotions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that the
state’s actions were proper, denying Jones’s motion and granting
Flowers’s motion.125 The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s judgment that the state tax sale statute complied with due

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 799.
See id.; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 453–54 (1982).
See Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 238 (2006).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 224.
Id. Flowers negotiated for approximately twenty-one thousand dollars. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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process requirements regarding service.126 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed.127
In a “new wrinkle,” the Court noted that precedent clearly required
state governments to take action beyond what is normally required
when it is known that the notice failed to reach the intended
recipient.128 The Court found that since the state’s certified letter was
returned unclaimed, it would be proper for the Court to inquire “what
the State does when a notice letter is returned unclaimed” before
determining the reasonability of the notice.129
The Court held that the state’s lack of further conduct was
unreasonable.130 Prior to the sale of the land, the state learned that its
method of notice had actually failed.131 The Court analogized the
returned letter to the state officer handing a stack of letters to a
postman, see that postman drop the letters down a storm drain, and do
nothing.132 “Failure[,]” wrote Chief Justice Roberts, “to follow up
would be unreasonable, despite the fact that the letters were
reasonably calculated to reach their intended recipients when
delivered to the postman.”133 Failure to take additional action
demonstrated that the state was not “desirous of actually informing”
the defendant Jones.134
Just as in Adams, the state in Jones argued that ignorance of the law
is no excuse: the owner of property should know that a tax sale
ensues from a failure to pay taxes.135 Again, the Court rejected this
argument because it was the state’s burden to serve the opposing
party.136
The Court further held that there were viable alternatives to the use
of certified mail.137 The use of regular mail would allow the letter “to
126. Id. at 225.
127. Id. at 239.
128. Id. at 227, 230 (“In Robinson v. Hanrahan, we held that notice . . . was inadequate
when the State knew that the property owner was in prison. . . . In Covey v. Town of
Somers, we held that notice of foreclosure by mailing, posting, and publication was
inadequate when town officials knew that the property owner was incompetent and
without a guardian’s protection.”) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 227, 231.
130. See id. at 234–35.
131. Id. at 223–24.
132. Id. at 229.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 230.
135. See id. at 231–32; Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 799 (1983).
136. See Jones, 547 U.S. at 233 (using Miranda rights as an example of well-known rights
that must still be respected by government actors).
137. See id. at 234–35.
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be examined at the end of the day” rather than only “retrieved from
the post office.”138 The state, however, was not required to check
local income tax rolls or other records.139 Requiring this would place
too great a burden with little return, because a certified letter marked
“unclaimed” denotes only that no one was home, not that it was the
wrong address.140
Jones defined how broadly the actual knowledge of a party may be
drawn out.141 The reasonably calculated notice may be reasonably
calculated when it was used, but if it is shown that actual notice was
not effected, a follow up of some kind is required on risk of failing to
demonstrate a desire to effect service.142
2.

Bringing New Technology into the Fold

Courts generally have to play “catch up” with the application of
legal doctrines regarding service due to the ever-changing
technological landscape.143 As discussed above, the Supreme Court
readily accepted the use of both regular and certified mail as
acceptable methods of service.144 Generally, the acceptance of other
methods of service has been left to lower courts to decide.145 Federal
trial courts accepted the use of telex machines during the Iranian
crises of the 1980s to serve businesses whose assets were being
attached for suit.146 Likewise, federal courts have also allowed fax
communication when that method was provided by a defendant as the
primary method of communication.147 The defendant in Broadfoot
was adamant that all communication between him and the plaintiff
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

144.
145.

146.
147.

Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id.
See id. at 225.
See id. at 230.
See, e.g., Broadfoot v. Diaz (In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs.), 245 B.R. 713, 721
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000). The court allowed service via fax machine decades after the
creation of the first commercially available fax machine. Id.; see The History of
Fax—from 1843 to Present Day, FAX AUTHORITY, http://faxauthority.com/fax-history/
(last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
See supra Section II.D.1.
See generally New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“[T]he [Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act] provides that if the other methods of service are unavailable, the
court may fashion a mode of service ‘consistent with the law of the place where
service is to be made.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976))).
Id. at 81.
Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 721.
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was to be conducted through fax.148 In the use of these two
technologies, courts were spared from considering a dueling of
method reliability because telex or fax were “the only means of
communication” available between the two parties.149 Because of the
unique circumstances and limited availability of alternative methods
of communication, and thus methods by which to serve process, both
courts held service to be sufficient.150
Electronic mail (email) was incorporated in Rio Properties v. Rio
International Interlink, a groundbreaking case decided by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in 2002.151 That court allowed service via
email, a holding noted by the court to be “upon untrodden ground.”152
No prior decision by a federal appeals court had ever addressed
service of process by email.153 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the
facts relied heavily on the defendant’s structuring of its business
“such that it could be contacted only via its email address.”154
Therefore, the courts were again spared from grappling with dueling
service options.155 The Ninth Circuit recognized that email had its
limitations: proof of receipt problems, compatibility issues, and
“[i]mprecise imaging technology” making official documents
difficult to read.156 Nevertheless, the appeals court trusted in a
district court’s ability to “balance the limitations of email service
against its benefits in any particular case,” and declared the service
sufficient.157
Some courts have gone to the extreme to provide service to a
defendant.158 In July 2015, the Domestic Violence Unit of the D.C.
Superior Court engineered an interesting solution to a defendant
attempting to evade service.159 The defendant had managed to evade
148. See id. at 718 (“From now on, you may contact me by FAX . . . .” (alteration in
original) (quoting the Pl.’s Aff. ¶ 11)).
149. Id. at 718–20; see New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 74.
150. See New Eng. Merchs. Nat’l Bank, 495 F. Supp. at 74; Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 719.
151. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. Id. at 1017.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1018.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1018–19.
158. See infra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
159. See Anonymous v. Anonymous, Case No. 2015-CPO 002, at *1–3 (D.C. Super. Ct.
July 29, 2015) (order granting temporary protective order), https://s3.amazonaws.com/
lawgical/assets/data/2730/original.pdf, noted in Kimberly Faber, Defendant Served
Temporary Protective Order via Text Message, SERVE NOW (July 29, 2015),
http://www.serve-now.com/articles/2112/defendant-served-temporary-protectiveorder-via-text-message.
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more than twelve service attempts of varying methods.160 The judge
determined the numerous attempts to be demonstrative of the
plaintiff’s diligence.161 The court decided the best, and perhaps only,
way to effect service via a means reasonably calculated to provide
notice was to send the notice via a text message.162
Social media has become the next layer of technology to be used to
effect service of process.163 Facebook,164 Twitter,165 LinkedIn,166 and
other websites all sit within this realm of digital interaction.
Facebook boasts 1.71 billion monthly active users who can interact
with other users through pictures, video, text, documents, webpage
hyperlinks, etc.167 Facebook also offers flexibility in that it can be
connected to various platforms or even other social media services.168
Twitter users are more limited in their communication as messages
are restricted to one hundred forty characters or less.169 Even still,
the so-called “microblogging service” nets more than three hundred
million users.170 LinkedIn, while very similar to other services,
garnered more than four hundred million users due to its different

160.
161.
162.
163.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *4–5.
See id. at *5–6.
See Lisa McManus, Service of Process Through Facebook, LEXISNEXIS (Nov. 9,
2011), https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/lexis-hub/b/legal-technology-andsocial-media/archive/2011/11/09/service-of-process-throughfacebook.aspx?Redirected=true; Service of Process via Social Media Becoming a
Reality?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 18, 2013), http://bna.com/service-process-viab17179872848/. Social media is defined as any form of electronic communication
through which people interact with one another through various communications and
communities. See Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 2nd Quarter 2016 (in
Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthlyactive-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
See id.
Number of Monthly Active Twitter Users Worldwide from 1st Quarter 2010 to 2nd
Quarter 2016 (in Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/numb
er-of-monthly-active-twitter-users/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
Id.
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purpose.171
LinkedIn acts as a way to create professional
relationships, search for jobs, or replace hard copy résumés.172
III. CURRENT TREATMENT OF SERVICE VIA SOCIAL
MEDIA
A. International Treatment
Nations around the world have been dealing with the issue of
service via social media for years.173 The United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have all approved service via
social media in certain cases.174 Of note, the Australian decision
allowed service of a default judgment via Facebook where the
biographical information of an account matched prior known
biographical information of the defendants.175 Each of the decisions
held concerns for accuracy, but every time the court allowed service
via social media because of the parties’ inability to contact the
defendant.176
B. Domestic Treatment
Courts in the United States have been lukewarm to the idea of
effecting service via social media.177 They have not, however,
entirely rejected the idea.178 In Baidoo v. Blood-Dzraku, a New York
trial court examined the possibility of service via Facebook.179 The
plaintiff had attempted to serve her husband with a divorce summons,
but he refused to meet and his last known address had been empty for
171. See Number of Monthly Active LinkedIn Members from 1st Quarter 2009 to 2nd
Quarter in 2016 (in Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/274050/qu
arterly-numbers-of-linkedin-members/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
172. Id.
173. See Court Order Served over Twitter, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/8285954.stm (last updated Oct. 1, 2009, 17:44
GMT).
174. Michael C. Lynch, You’ve Been ‘Poked’! ‘PCCare247’ and Service of Process by
Social Media, 249 N.Y. L.J. (2013), http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/
1728/_res/id=Files/index=0/1728.pdf.
175. Id.
176. See Pedram Tabibi, Facebook Notification – You’ve Been Served: Why Social Media
Service of Process May Soon Be a Virtual Reality, 7 PHX. L. REV. 37, 40–41 (2013).
177. See Andrews v. McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 50–51 (Okla.
2014); Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL
2086950, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
178. See FTC. v. PCCare247 Inc., 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *5–6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013); Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 713–14, 716
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
179. 5 N.Y.S.3d at 713–14, 716.
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years.180 With the defendant evading service and no accurate address
to send a letter to, the court had few other choices.181 The court,
citing New York rules that allow other methods of service provided
that the method can be shown to satisfy the Mullane test,182 allowed
the plaintiff to follow through with her proposed method of service—
sending the summons to the defendant’s Facebook account via a
private message.183 Just as Rio Properties noted that email service
was “untrodden ground,”184 the court in Baidoo stated that allowing
social media service would be “beyond the safe harbor of statutory
prescription.”185 Even so, the trial judge found that, because the
plaintiff was able to show with reasonable certainty that the account
was used by the defendant and that publication was less likely to
reach the defendant, the use of Facebook to provide service passed
constitutional due process requirements.186
In FTC v. PCCare247, the federal district court wrestled with
whether service by both email and social media would be sufficient
for a foreign defendant.187 The defendants were alleged to have run a
fraudulent business charging Americans for “fixing” problems with
their computers.188 Even though a different Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure applies to international defendants,189 both analyses must
look to whether due process is satisfied by the method of service.190
Service by Facebook message alone would bring a “substantial
question” for consideration, particularly because of the ability to fake
profile information.191 The plaintiff’s use, however, of email and
significant facts which demonstrated that the targeted account would
be the correct one, assuaged the court’s fears.192 Notably, the court
stated that “courts must remain open to considering requests to
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at 712.
See id. at 713.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 715.
Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002).
Baidoo, 5 N.Y.S.3d at 713.
Id. at 715–16.
See FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013).
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f) (rules of service for international defendants); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)
(rules of service for domestic defendants).
See PCCare247, 2013 WL 841037, at *2 (quoting SEC v. Anticevic, No. 5 CV 6991
(KMW), 2009 WL 361739, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2009) (citation omitted)).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6.

158

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46

authorize service via technological means of then-recent vintage.”193
This was especially important to the court because as defendants
become more involved in modern technology, it more closely
“comports with due process to serve them by those means.”194
Likewise, the court in Who’sHere, Inc. v. Orun dealt with a foreign
defendant.195 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed upon
its trademark.196 The defendant was in contact with the plaintiff, but
only through electronic means.197 The plaintiff asked the court to
allow service by both email and social media.198 This time, however,
the court recognized that any of the individual methods of service
would likely have been sufficient.199 The various factual supports,
such as cross-references of the name and email from the account with
information provided by the defendant, led the court to hold that
service via social media was sufficient.200
Not all courts have been as open-minded regarding service.201 In
Fortunato v. Chase Bank, the court was concerned with the accuracy
of the targeted account.202 The court declared social media service
“unorthodox” and remained “skeptical” that delivery of the notice
would actually apprise the recipient account of the proceedings
against the party.203 Even though the defendant went through various
other attempts to effect service, the court was leery of the defendant’s
desire to actually provide notice.204 The court ordered service by
publication in local newspapers.205
In the only case on point to be opined upon by a jurisdiction’s
highest court, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma declared that service
via social media—Facebook in particular—categorically cannot be
sufficient to provide service on par with constitutional
requirements.206 An adoption case, Andrews, dealt with a father’s
193. Id. at *5.
194. Id.
195. WhosHere, Inc. v. Orun, No. 1:13-cv-00526-AJT-TRJ, 2014 WL 670817, at *1 (E.D.
Va. Feb. 20, 2014).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at *2.
199. Id. at *4.
200. Id. at *4–5.
201. See Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012).
202. Id. at *2–3.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *3.
206. See Andrews v. McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 51 (Okla. 2014).
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loss of custody rights.207 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
notice via Facebook does not comport with constitutional
requirements.208 Even though the court could have created a narrow
holding that there were other more reasonable methods of effecting
service,209 the court decided to boldly state that “[t]his Court is
unwilling to declare notice via Facebook alone sufficient to meet the
requirements [of the federal and state constitutions] because . . . [i]t is
. . . a mere gesture.”210 The court flatly rejected Facebook, and likely
all other social media platforms, as a viable means of effecting
service.211
C. Future Proposals
Ultimately, courts around the nation have decided the issue fairly
evenly.212 Because of this disparity of answers, even in similar
factual situations, some have called for changes to the way courts
view the issue.213 Legislative enactments could be used to explicitly
allow for service by electronic communication.214 Other advocates
state that because electronic communication methods are reliable,
traditional service should be dispensed with as “time-consuming,
overly expensive, or unsuccessful.”215 The efficiency of electronic
communication, combined with modern society’s reliance on such
communication, often allows it to be a more reasonable method than
traditional methods.216 At the very least, some scholars have noted
that courts should use particular sets of factors to determine if a
particular use of social media is sufficient.217 Often included are: (1)
the nature of the media platform in relation to the needs of effective
service; (2) the existence of corroborative evidence to verify accuracy

207. Id. at 40–41.
208. Id. at 50 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315
(1950)).
209. The two parents had been in physical contact with one another during the proceeding
and were even on speaking terms. Id. at 51.
210. Id. (first citing Booth v. McKnight, 70 P.3d 855, 862–63 (Okla. 2003); then citing
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
211. Id.
212. See supra Section III.B.
213. See Tabibi, supra note 176, at 39.
214. See id. at 52–56.
215. Svetlana Gitman, Comment, (Dis)Service of Process: The Need to Amend Rule 4 to
Comply with Modern Usage of Technology, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 459, 470 (2012).
216. See id. at 472–74.
217. See Knapp, supra note 1 at 575–76.
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in the targeted account; and (3) the existence of evidence that the
targeted account is actually used.218
IV. THE TEST
A. Failures of Prior Tests
The Mullane test’s flexibility allows it to move with the changing
times.219 The various courts’ application of that test is not always as
flexible as intended.220 The use of the three factors outlined above is
strongly advocated when a court allows service by social media.221
These factors alone, however, do not delve deeply enough into an
understanding of the discrete particularities of each social media
platform.222 Likewise, flat statements rejecting social media as
always failing to comport with constitutional requirements tends to
show a lack of understanding of the systems and their ever-increasing
use in modern communication.223 Therefore, more detail is needed
and more factors should be considered when examining the
individual methods of communication.224
B. New Test
A new, more detailed test should make it evident as to whether the
use of social media can be reasonably calculated to effect service.225
The test proposed here should take the following factors into
consideration. First, are the broader means of communication
publicly accessible? Second, is the direct method to be used private
to the defendant? Third, is the communication directly targeted to the
defendant? Fourth, is there corroborative evidence that the targeted
218. Id. at 576.
219. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
220. Compare Rio Props. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950))
(allowing email as a form of service under the same Mullane test), with Andrews v.
McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.), 341 P.3d 38, 50–51 (Okla. 2014) (first citing
Booth v. McKnight, 70 P.3d 855, 862 (Okla. 2003); then citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at
314–15) (denying email as a form of service under Mullane).
221. See Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714–16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
222. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (calling into question limitations on service of
process by email, such as lack of receipt confirmation, limited use of electronic
signatures, system compatibility issues, and imprecise imaging technology); Andrews,
341 P.3d at 54 (Winchester, J., dissenting) (noting that Facebook has two types of
message formats).
223. See Andrews, 341 P.3d at 51.
224. See id.; see also Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017–18.
225. See supra Section IV.A.
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user is the correct one, and further, that the account is active? Fifth,
are there terms of service requirements that force users to display
their actual identifying information? Sixth and finally, do the broader
means and the specific method of communication have the ability to
transmit entire documents? These factors, taken together, would give
courts a better understanding of whether service by social media can
be reasonably calculated to apprise the other party of proceedings
against them.226
1.

Public Means

The means by which notice is given should be public. Just as
anyone has access to a person walking in public, the mail, or even a
newspaper, notice should only be allowed through electronic means
to which anyone has access.227 This would exclude means such as
private forum sites, where joining the forum requires a screener who
has the option to accept or deny you.228 A private forum may exclude
anyone it chooses.229 Rather, a public means would include most
major social networks, such as Facebook or Twitter, which require
only that the proper information be provided with no other delay or
option to deny at the time of registration.230 Forcing a party to
provide notice via public means would protect most individuals’
access to justice and keep the goals of service consistent: protecting
the due process rights of individuals.231 Anyone with internet access

226. Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950). The old
Mullane test was “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . .” Id. Compare this with the
proposed 5-factor test.
227. Knapp, supra note 1, at 576.
228. Compare About Facebook, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info (last visited Oct. 31, 2016)
(an example of a public website that anyone can access), with About, DRUPAL,
https://www.drupal.org/about (last visited Oct. 31, 2016) (a private forum with a
screening process).
229. See, e.g., Private Forums and Member-Only Sites, DRUPAL (Jan. 22, 2007),
https://www.drupal.org/node/111576 (“A private forum is one which is only available
to registered members, or to only a certain class of users (or ‘members’).”).
230. Registration for either Facebook or Twitter requires only the input of identifying and
contact information.
See How Do I Sign Up for Facebook?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/188157731232424 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016);
Signing Up with Twitter, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/100990 (last
visited Oct. 31, 2016).
231. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 549–50.
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(or even a local library) would have the ability to serve their
opponent.232
2.

Private Method

While the means of serving process should be public, the specific
method of contact should be private. Courts have attempted to
protect privacy where possible.233 While anyone has access to the
mail, only the intended recipient is allowed to open and read the
contents of the letter.234 This would ensure that only the targeted
individual is the most likely to be served.235 A standard Facebook
post, or even a post on someone’s page would not be private.236 Only
a post viewable solely by the recipient or a direct message would
provide both reasonable notice and actual information to the intended
recipient.237
3.

Direct Communication

In order to ensure that the intended recipient of the communication
actually receives the communication, the notice should be targeted
directly to the intended user.238 Because sufficient service requires
reasonable efforts to effect service, an indirect communication (such
as a tweet) is no better than publication.239 Indirect communication is
232. Libraries serve a particularly important part of communities where affluence is
uncommon. U.S. Public Libraries Provide Critical Access to Internet Services, AM.
LIBR. ASS’N, http://www.ala.org/research/sites/ala.org.research/files/content/initiatives
/plftas/issuesbriefs/connectivitybrief_2009_10_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2016)
(“Nearly all of America’s 16,604 public library buildings offer free public access to
computers, to the Internet and to trained staff equipped to help . . . .”).
233. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992) (upholding a
woman’s right to privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
(recognizing privacy rights in a marriage and holding government interference with
that privacy right to be unconstitutional).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2012).
235. See id.
236. Creating a standard Facebook post merely publishes the content to any number of
your social connections on the site. See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last
visited Oct. 31, 2016). Posting directly to another user’s “Timeline” will notify them
of the publication, but will be viewable by anyone visiting that user’s page. Id.
237. See How Do I Send a Private Message to a Page?, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/142031279233975 (last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
238. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 576.
239. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (“Chance
alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type
inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area
of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach
him are large indeed. The chance of actual notice is further reduced when as here the
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offered in the hopes that, if the intended recipient does not see the
notice, someone who knows the intended recipient will realize that
the notice should be passed along.240 Electronic communication
should be directed at the recipient to avoid the various, and welldocumented, problems that come along with publication.241
4.

Corroborating Evidence to Prove Accuracy and Activity

Currently, courts examine the likelihood of a targeted user account
being the correct user.242 That analysis should continue. Mullane
requires that notice be reasonably likely to apprise the opponent of
the suit.243 For service to be effective, the plaintiff must have some
evidence to show that the notice was served on the correct user’s
account.244 There may be fifty different men named David Johnson
in any given metro locale; the plaintiff must use corroborating
indicators to show that the account served belongs to the correct
David Johnson.245 Digital interactions such as events, pictures, or
“check-in” locations, coupled with date and time stamps, can be used
to show that the intended user owns and operates the account being
served.246
Furthermore, just as the correct user account should be
corroborated, so too should some proof be given to show that the
account is actually used.247 Proof of actual use would safeguard the
Mullane requirements.248 This evidence is not difficult to attain from

240.
241.
242.

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

notice required does not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and
does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention.”). The statement made
in Mullane holds true today for the public posting of social media content as it did in
the mid-twentieth century for newspapers. See id.
Such intent is a hallmark of failure to provide sufficient notice. See supra notes 130–
134 and accompanying text.
See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315–17.
See FTC v. PCCare247 Inc., 12 Civ. 7189(PAE), 2013 WL 841037, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 7, 2013) (“Service by email alone comports with due process where a plaintiff
demonstrates that the email is likely to reach the defendant.” (citing Gurung v.
Malhotra, 279 F.R.D. 215, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2011))).
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940);
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Priest v. Board of Trs., 232 U.S. 604,
613 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 404 (1900)).
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76; Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 276–77.
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 576.
See id.
Id.
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15 (chosen method of service must “reasonably” inform the
defendant of the suit); see Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78 (following
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most social networks.249 Any post would show activity, but many
social media platforms and email services also allow for some form
of read receipt.250 These receipts would allow the sender to confirm
that the account was actually in use and provide reasonable assurance
that the intended target was served.251
5.

Terms of Service Requirements

Ensuring accuracy is a must when determining whether service of
process was sufficient.252 Under current law, the primary inquiry for
electronic service is to determine whether the account is correct.253
While that inquiry should continue, courts should not end the analysis
there; they should also consider the terms of service for the social
media platform being used for service.254 Some social media
platforms have terms of service that require the user to provide
accurate identifying information when registering under pain of being
banned from using the platform.255 Others, especially forums created
for a small club or group, may be allowed or even encouraged to hide
their true identity.256 Because of the low reliability of the information
provided and stored by these platforms, they should be excluded from
providing sufficient service of process if it is found that the terms of
service for the webpage: (a) do not require correct information or (b)
do not have the penalty of expulsion for failing to provide the correct
information.257 This would include nearly all major social media

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

255.
256.
257.

service via Facebook, the defendant’s activity on his or her account would indicate
whether or not there was proof of service).
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76; Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78.
See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78; see also Send Messages, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/487151698161671/?helpref=hc_fnav (last visited
Oct. 31, 2016).
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76 (citing Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No.
06 CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007)); Wagner & Castillo,
supra note 6, at 277–78.
See Knapp, supra note 1, at 576; Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 276–77.
Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 714–15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 276 (acknowledging during a discussion of
account authenticity that “Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities
requires users to provide real names and accurate, up-to-date information on their
profile” and the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court accepted that
“information on the defendant’s Facebook profile matched birth dates, lists of friends,
and email addresses provided by defendant . . . .”).
See id. Even though there is little to stop someone from using a fake identity, any
encouragement to aid societal decisions is helpful.
See Michael E. Lackey, Jr. & Joseph P. Minta, The Ethics of Disguised Identity in
Social Media, 24 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 447, 457–59 (2014).
See id.
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platforms and provide some assurance that the information used to
determine whether the account is the correct one is accurate.258
6.

Ability to Transmit the Entire Document

Every examination into sufficiency of process must examine the
contents of the alleged notice.259 An examination into service via
social media is no different.260 The court should examine whether the
method of contact allows the sender to provide documentation, which
would prove to the reader that the information is true.261 One of the
problems with electronic service is its believability.262 If a Facebook
user looks to his or her account and sees a direct message that states:
“You are hereby notified that your presence in X Court will be
required on Y Date,” the user is likely to be suspicious as to its
authenticity.263 If, however, that same user were to receive a message
from someone he or she knows and that message had official
documents attached with the same information and the seal of the
court and/or the signature of the clerk, that message would be more
likely to be believed.264
This requirement would somewhat limit the technology capable of
being used to provide sufficient service.265 Not every platform
allows a user to send a scanned or photographed copy of a document
to another user.266 Nevertheless, this requirement would allow a
258. See id. (discussing social media sites which do not require the use of true identities
and those which purposefully provide anonymity); see also Wagner & Castillo, supra
note 6, at 276–77.
259. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (quoting
Am. Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47, 67 (1911)).
260. See id. (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234
U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Priest v. Board of Trs., 232 U.S. 604, 613 (1914); Roller v.
Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 404 (1900)); Knapp supra note 1, at 563.
261. See Mullane, 339 U.S. 306, 314; Knapp, supra note 1, at 563, 576.
262. So-called “spam” emails have created a culture where anything claiming to be
“official” is subject to scrutiny by the reader. See Arik Hesseldahl, Why the Spam
Keeps Coming, FORBES (Nov. 19, 2004, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2004/11/
19/cx_ah_1119tentech.html. By attaching a copy of the actual official document, the
reader would be far more likely to believe the contents. See Knapp, supra note 1, at
576.
263. See Hesseldahl, supra note 262.
264. See id.; Knapp, supra note 1, at 576.
265. Knapp, supra note 1, at 576.
266. Twitter does not support full documentation, forcing users to rely on third-party
services to do so. Jason Kincaid, TwitDoc: Proving that Every File Format Will
Eventually Be Shareable over Twitter, TECHCRUNCH (May 8, 2009),
https://techcrunch.com/2009/05/08/twitdoc-proving-that-every-file-format-will-
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plaintiff to send accurate and official information to the targeted user
with a much higher probability that the receiving user would believe
the information to be accurate.267
7.

Proof of Actual Receipt

The final note, though not a factor, is, in reality, a sufficiency of
evidence analysis. The court should examine whether the method of
contact within the social media platform includes some indication of
a proof of receipt.268 For example, a direct message to a Facebook
user shows when the user viewed it, even if that person does not reply
to the message.269 Not all platforms, however, currently display
when another person reads your message (e.g., Twitter being one of
these).270 This requirement should act as a method of weeding out
weak evidence that a user has had the opportunity to see the notice.271
If there is little or no activity on the account and there is no way to
tell if the message has been received, such information tends to show
a lack of notice.272 Conversely, if there is either little activity but a
read receipt or much activity and no read receipt, the court should
slide the scale in the direction of allowing service.273

267.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

eventually-be-shareable-over-twitter/; see, e.g., TWITDOC, http://twitdoc.com/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2016). Because of this, service via Twitter would be unlikely to
comport with the test propounded here. Decisions like St. Francis Assisi v. Kuwait
Fin. House, No. 3:16-CV-3240-LB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136152 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
30, 2016), though dealing with an international defendant, would likely be reversed,
or at least require a deeper analysis than was offered.
See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (citing
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394
(1914); Priest v. Board of Trs., 232 U.S. 604, 613 (1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S.
398, 404 (1900)); Knapp supra note 1, at 563, 576.
See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 277–78.
See Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/ (last visited Oct. 31,
2016).
See David Nield, Can You See if a DM Has Been Read on Twitter?, TECH IN OUR
EVERYDAY LIFE, http://techin.oureverydaylife.com/can-see-dm-read-twitter-2123.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2016).
See Wagner & Castillo, supra note 6, at 278 (“[C]ourts must order the alternative
notice most reasonably calculated to provide notice . . . .”).
Cf. id. at 277–78 (discussing how posting on one’s Facebook wall tends to provide
notice).
See id. (discussing that posting on a Facebook wall is an example of “alternative
service” that “present[s] an increasingly high probability of providing notice in
today’s tech-driven society”); see also Knapp, supra note 1, at 575–76 (quoting Philip
Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988(GBD), 2007 WL 725412, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007)).
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C. Comparative Improvements
If this test had been used by the courts in Fortunato and Andrews,
the reasoning of those two decisions, if not the holding themselves,
would likely have been different.274 In Fortunato, the plaintiff failed
to place any facts before the court to show whether the targeted user
was the correct one.275 The court’s general skepticism was born out
in its holding,276 but if this new test had been considered the court
would be forced to recognize that while this particular instance of
service may have lacked sufficient facts and evidence, the practice of
providing notice via social media can be constitutionally sufficient.277
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s broad holding in
Andrews would have been significantly narrower, if not flipped. The
court relied on the possibility that no notification would pass to the
actual user.278 This fact, however, excluded any analysis as to
whether the account was actually used or if the plaintiff attained a
read receipt.279 Such an analysis may have forced the court to further
examine the workings of communication by social media rather than
flatly reject it.
V. CONCLUSION
Many courts’ quick dismissal of social media service because of
the “unorthodoxy” of new methods will push courts into further
inefficiencies.280 The movement of both state and federal courts to
digital filing systems has demonstrated how efficient electronic
methods may be.281 The next step in the litigation process to go

274. Fortunato v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., No. 11 Civ. 6608(JFK), 2012 WL 2086950, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2012) (denying Defendant’s application to serve third-party
complaint by email, Facebook, and delivery to Plaintiff, but granting application for
alternate service by publication); Andrews v. McCall (In re Adoption of K.P.M.A.),
341 P.3d 38, 50–51 (Okla. 2014) (holding that a message sent by mother to putative
father via a social networking website did not provide putative father with notice (first
citing Booth v. McKnight, 70 P.3d 855; then citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &
Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950))).
275. Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2.
276. Id. at *2–3.
277. See Baidoo v. Blood–Dzraku, 5 N.Y.S.3d 709, 715–16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).
278. See Andrews, 341 P.3d at 51 (first citing Booth, 70 P.3d at 865; then citing Mullane,
339 U.S. at 315).
279. See id.
280. See Fortunato, 2012 WL 2086950, at *2.
281. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 562.
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digital should be service. This is born out in the progression of
technological inclusion in service jurisprudence.282
This new test may not create a universal method of determining
service sufficiency. Its use in a court’s analysis, however, would
force the court to interact with the digital world and manipulate
digital communication methods within the existing realm of service
jurisprudence.283 That manipulation turns into wider use of digital
communication; the use turns into stronger jurisprudence and a better
understanding of the due process rights belonging to citizens of the
United States.

282. See supra Part II.
283. See supra Part IV.

